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The differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol was proposed aiming
at simple implementation, but it can tolerate only a small disturbance in a quantum channel. The
round-robin DPS (RRDPS) protocol could be a good solution for this problem, which in fact can
tolerate even up to 50% of a bit error rate. Unfortunately, however, such a high tolerance can be
achieved only when we compromise the simplicity, i.e., Bob’s measurement must involve a large
number of random delays (|R| denotes its number), and in a practical regime of |R| being small,
the tolerance is low. In this paper, we propose a new DPS protocol to achieve a higher tolerance
than the one in the original DPS protocol, in which the measurement setup is less demanding than
the one of the RRDPS protocol for the high tolerance regime. We call the new protocol the small-
number-random DPS (SNRDPS) protocol, and in this protocol, we add only a small amount of
randomness to the original DPS protocol, i.e., 2 ≤ |R| ≤ 10. In fact, we found that the performance
of the SNRDPS protocol is significantly enhanced over the original DPS protocol only by employing
a few additional delays such as |R| = 2. Also, we found that the key generation rate of the SNRDPS
protocol outperforms the RRDPS protocol without monitoring the bit error rate when it is less than
5% and |R| ≤ 10. Our protocol is an intermediate protocol between the original DPS protocol and
the RRDPS protocol, and it increases the variety of the DPS-type protocols with quantified security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) holds promise for
realizing information-theoretically secure communication
between two distant parties (Alice and Bob) against any
eavesdropper (Eve). Since the first invention of the
BB84 protocol [1], many QKD protocols have been pro-
posed [2–7]. Among them, the differential-phase-shift
(DPS) QKD [5] can be rather simply implemented with a
passive detection unit. A field demonstration of the DPS
protocol [8] has been already been conducted, and the
information-theoretical security proof of the DPS proto-
col has been established by Tamaki et al [9, 10]. Unfor-
tunately, however, this proof shows that the DPS proto-
col can tolerate only a small bit error rate regime (less
than 4% with a typical block length of L light pulses, say
L = 32).
Recently, in order to solve this problem, a new type
of protocol called the round-robin differential-phase-shift
(RRDPS) QKD protocol [11] was proposed. This is a
modified protocol from the original DPS protocol in that
Bob’s measurement has a freedom to randomly choose
which pair of the incoming pulses to be interfered. This
modification brings a distinct feature to the RRDPS pro-
tocol that the security can be guaranteed without mon-
itoring any disturbance between Alice and Bob. More-
over, when the number of random delays (we denote it by
|R|) is large, the RRDPS protocol has a strong tolerance
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to the bit error rate, and surprisingly it can tolerate the
bit error rate of even 50% when |R| → ∞. Thanks to
these features, the RRDPS protocol has attracted theo-
retical works [12–16], and proof-of-principle experiments
have been demonstrated [12, 17–19]. Unfortunately, how-
ever, an experimental implementation of the RRDPS pro-
tocol is not as simple as the one of the original DPS
protocol. One of the main technological challenges for
its realization is to switch the delay at random for each
block of the pulses at Bob’s measurement. According
to the number of the random delays, some passive inter-
ferometers [12] or a variable-delay interferometer [17] or
some optical switches [18] are needed for Bob’s measure-
ment. Obviously, when the number of the random delays
increases, an implementation of Bob’s measurement will
be complicated. Hence, from a practical viewpoint, it is
preferable to implement the RRDPS protocol with small
|R|, for instance, |R| = 4 as demonstrated in [12].
In this paper, we consider to improve the bit error tol-
erance of the DPS protocol without significantly increas-
ing the difficulties of its implementation. For this, we
consider to add only a small amount of randomness, say
2 ≤ |R| ≤ 10, to the DPS protocol. This modification
can also be seen as the modification from the RRDPS
protocol in that the new protocol exploits more pulses
than that of the RRDPS protocol for a given |R|. Im-
portantly, this modification does not increase any exper-
imental difficulty at Bob’s side. We call the new protocol
the small-number-random DPS (SNRDPS) protocol. We
present the information-theoretical security of our pro-
tocol, in which we have made some assumptions on the
devices. In particular, we assume perfect phase modula-
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2tions (namely, Alice’s phase modulation is exactly 0 or
pi) and block-wise phase randomization (the state of the
L pulses is a classical mixture of photon number states).
With these assumptions, we prove the security based on
the Shor-Preskill’s security proof [20]. By using the re-
sult of the security proof, we compare the performance
of the SNRDPS protocol and the one of the original DPS
protocol. As a result, we found that the key generation
rate is significantly improved only with a few additional
delays, say |R| = 2. For instance, if the bit error rate e(b)
is 2%, the key generation rate of the SNRDPS protocol
with |R| = 2 scales as O(η3/2) with a channel transmit-
tance η in a longer distance regime while the original
DPS protocol scales as O(η2). Also, when e(b) = 5%, the
SNRDPS protocol with |R| = 2 gives a positive key gen-
eration rate while the original DPS protocol cannot give
a positive one. Therefore, the small number of random
delays provides a significant improvement in the result-
ing key generation rate compared to the one of the DPS
protocol.
Moreover, we compare the key generation rates of the
SNRDPS protocol and the ones of the RRDPS protocol
without monitoring the disturbance when the same num-
ber of the random delays |R| is employed between two
protocols. Consequently, we found that the SNRDPS
protocol gives a better key generation rate than the one
of the RRDPS protocol without monitoring the bit error
rate when |R| is less than 10 and the bit error rate is
small such as less than 5%.
This paper is organized as follows. First, in Sec. II
we explain the DPS-type QKD protocol including the
assumptions on Alice and Bob’s devices. Next, in Sec. III
we prove the security of the DPS-type protocol, where
our security proof is based on the Shor-Preskill’s security
proof [20]. After that, in Sec. IV we show the simulation
results for the SNRDPS protocol, and compare the key
generation rates with the various numbers of the random
delays |R| = {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}. Finally, we summarize the
paper in Sec. V.
II. DPS-TYPE QKD PROTOCOL
In this section, before providing the description of the
actual protocol, we first list up the assumptions on Alice
and Bob’s devices. See FIG. 1 for the actual setup.
A. Assumptions on Alice and Bob’s devices
First, we describe the assumptions on Alice’s source.
We assume that it emits a single-mode coherent light
pulse, and Alice splits its pulse into a block of L pulses.
The L pulses are block-wise phase randomized, namely,
the quantum state of the L pulses is described as a classi-
cal mixture of photon number states. The relative phase
between the adjacent pulses is modulated by 0 or pi ac-
cording to her randomly chosen bit 0 or 1, respectively.
Next, as for Bob’s device, it is equipped with two
photon-number-resolving (PNR) detectors that can dis-
criminate among 0, 1, and more than 1 photon. He first
splits L incoming pulses into two blocks of L pulses by
using a 50 : 50 beam splitter (BS), shifts backward only
one of the L-pulse blocks by r that is chosen randomly
from the set R ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , L− 1}. Then, the first L− r
pulses in the shifted block will be interfered with the last
L− r pulses in the other block with another 50 : 50 BS,
and then Bob performs a photon measurement with the
PNR detectors. Each of the detectors corresponds to the
bit value of 0 and 1, respectively (see FIG. 1). Finally,
we assume that there is no side-channel.
B. DPS-type QKD
We describe “DPS-type” QKD protocol, which is the
generalization of the DPS QKD protocol in that it em-
ploys the arbitrary number of random delays, and there-
fore DPS-type protocol includes both the original DPS
protocol and the RRDPS protocol. The protocol of the
DPS-type QKD runs as follows.
(A1) Alice generates a random L-bit string ~s ≡
(s1, s2, . . . , sL), a random number δ ∈ [0, 2pi), and
then she prepares a block of L coherent pulses in
the following state
|Ψ〉 =
L⊗
k=1
|(−1)skeiδα〉k , (1)
where |(−1)skeiδα〉k represents the coherent state
of the kth pulse. She sends |Ψ〉 to Bob through a
quantum channel.
(A2) Bob splits the incoming L pulses into two L-pulse
blocks by using the 50 : 50 BS. He applies a de-
lay rT to one of the paths in the Mach-Zehnder
interferometer, where T denotes the interval be-
tween two adjacent pulses in the block and r is
chosen uniformly at random from the set R ⊂
{1, 2, . . . , L − 1}. After that, Bob makes interfer-
ence between two L-pulse blocks by using the other
50 : 50 BS and performs the photon detection with
the photon number resolving detectors. Let us call
the event detected if he detects exactly one photon
in the pair of (kth, (k+ r)th) (1 ≤ k ≤ L− r) inter-
fering pulses and detects the vacuum in all of the
other pulses (including 2r half pulses that do not
interfere with any other half pulses). If the event
is not detected, Alice and Bob skip steps (A3) and
(A4).
(A3) Bob takes note of the detected bit value sB and
announces the pair of numbers (i, j) = (k, k + r)
over an authenticated public channel.
(A4) Alice takes note of the bit value sA = sk ⊕ sk+r.
(A5) Alice and Bob repeat steps (A1) through (A4) N
times, and let NQ be the number of the detected
events.
37th 2nd 1st
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FIG. 1. Schematics of the SNRDPS protocol for L = 7 and R = {1, 6, 2, 5}. Alice sends 7 coherent pulses after she applies
a random phase shift δ or δ + pi to each of the pulses with a phase modulator (PM), where δ is chosen uniformly and at
random from [0, 2pi). After Bob receives the incoming 7 pulses, he splits them into two blocks of 7 pulses with the first beam
splitter (BS1), and shifts backward by rT to one of the blocks. Here, T denotes the interval between two adjacent pulses of the
incoming block. By using the second beam splitter (BS2) and two photon-number-resolving detectors (D0 and D1), he observes
the relative phase of two pulses in the block. Note that, each bit in the sifted key is generated from a block where Bob has
detected one photon from one pair of the interfering pulses and has detected the vacuum in all the other pulses. We call such
an event detected event. For example, if r = 2 is chosen and Bob detects exactly one photon in the pair of (3rd, 5th)-interfering
pulses and detects the vacuum in all of the other pulses, he obtains the relative phase between the 3rd and the 5th interfering
pulses. If the relative phase is 0 (pi), he obtains the sifted bit sB = 0 (1).
(A6) Alice and Bob randomly select a small portion ξ
of NQ detected events, and compare the bit values
over an authenticated public channel. This gives
the estimate of the bit error rate.
(A7) Alice and Bob discuss over an authenticated pub-
lic channel to perform error correction and privacy
amplification on the remaining portion to share a
final key of length GN(1− ξ).
Note that the DPS-type protocol includes the original
DPS and the RRDPS protocols by choosing R in step
(A2) as R = {1} and R = {1, 2, . . . , L− 1}, respectively.
Also, we define the SNRDPS protocol by setting R =⋃t
m=1{m,L−m} with 0 < t < L/2.
III. SECURITY PROOF
In this section, we prove the security of the SNRDPS
protocol with R = ⋃tm=1{m,L − m} for 0 < t < L/2.
Our security proof can be summarized as follows. First,
in Sec. III A we convert the actual protocol to an al-
ternative protocol for simplicity of the analysis, where
Bob performs the alternative measurement (we call it
the dial measurement) instead of the actual one. Note
that, by switching Bob’s actual measurement with the
delays r and L − r uniformly at random, we show that
he can simulate the dial measurement characterized by
the delay r with a 50% of additional detection loss (see
Lemma 1 below). Therefore, by introducing the addi-
tional loss in the alternative measurement, the dial mea-
surement is equivalent to the actual measurement, and
therefore we can employ the alternative measurement in
the security proof. Next, in Sec. III B we introduce an
entanglement distillation protocol as a virtual protocol
to prove the security of the protocol with the alternative
measurement. After that, we construct the POVM ele-
ments corresponding to the bit and phase error rates in
Sec. III C, and derive a relation between the bit and phase
errors by employing some constraint on Alice’s sending
state in the virtual protocol in Sec. III D, and obtain an
upper bound on the phase error rate as the function of
the bit error rate in Sec. III E.
A. Bob’s alternative measurement
In this subsection, we introduce Bob’s alternative mea-
surement, which we will employ in the security proof. In
step (A2), Bob extracts the detected events, in which only
one photon is contained in the incoming L pulses. Here,
{|k〉B}Lk=1 denotes the set of basis vectors of the Hilbert
space HB, and |k〉B represents that the kth pulse sent is
in a single-photon state. Let {Bˆ(r)k,s}k,s be the POVM for
the bit value s detected at the pair of (kth, (k + r)th)-
interfering pulses under the condition that the delay r is
chosen. Considering the effect of the 50:50 BS, {Bˆ(r)k,s} is
written as
Bˆ
(r)
k,s :=
1
2
Pˆ
( |k〉B + (−1)s |k + r〉B√
2
)
, (2)
for 1 ≤ k ≤ L−r. Here, we define Pˆ (|φ〉) ≡ |φ〉〈φ|. From
Eq. (2), the probability of obtaining the bit value s and
the pair of interfering pulses (k, k+r) in his measurement
with the delay r is given by Tr
(
ρˆBˆ
(r)
k,s
)
for an arbitrary
state ρˆ given that exactly one photon is contained in the
L pulses.
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FIG. 2. Schematics of (a) Bob’s “dial measurement” with L = 5 and the delay r′ = 2 and (b) the corresponding actual
measurement. In the dial measurement, there are five patterns of successful detection events. Concretely, he obtains the
relative phase between one of the following five pairs of interfering pulses: (1st, 3rd), (2nd, 4th), (3rd, 5th) represented by the
regime surrounded by the solid line, (1st, 4th), or (2nd, 5th) represented by the regime surrounded by the dashed line. In the
actual measurement, by using a specific delay r′ or L− r′, he can obtain a part of information that he could obtain in his dial
measurement with the delay r′. For example, if he employs the delay r′ (= 2) in (b), he can obtain the relative phase between
either (1st, 3rd), (2nd, 4th) or (3rd, 5th) interfering pulses in (a). These events correspond to those in the regime surrounded
by the solid line in (b). Also, if he employs the delay L− r′ (= 3) in (b), he can obtain the relative phase between either (1st,
4th) or (2nd, 5th) interfering pulses in (a). These events correspond to those in the regime surrounded by the dashed line in
(b). Therefore, if he switches the delay r′ or L− r′ uniformly at random in his actual measurement, he can simulate the dial
measurement with the delay r′, while the detection efficiency of his actual measurement is half that of his dial measurement
(see Lemma 1 below).
Next, for simplicity of the security analysis, we con-
vert Bob’s actual measurement into the alternative one.
We call it the dial measurement, which gives the relative
phase of an arbitrary pair of (ith, jth) (i < j) interfer-
ing pulses such that j − i = r or L − r for given r (see
FIG. 2(a)). This measurement has more symmetry than
the actual measurement, which makes our analysis much
simpler, and importantly it is equivalent to the actual
measurement except for 50% of losses as we explain in
Lemma 1 below. The POVM {Eˆ(r)k,s}k,s of the dial mea-
surement with the delay r is defined by
Eˆ
(r)
k,s :=
1
2
Pˆ
( |k〉B + (−1)s |k +L r〉B√
2
)
, (3)
for 1 ≤ k ≤ L. Here, +L denotes the summation in
modulo L, namely, for integers (p, q) with 1 ≤ p ≤ L and
1 ≤ q ≤ L,
p+L q =
{
p+ q if p+ q ≤ L,
p+ q − L if p+ q ≥ L+ 1. (4)
If Bob performs the dial measurement with the delay r,
the probability of obtaining the bit value s and the pair
of interfering pulses (k, k +L r) is given by Tr
(
ρˆEˆ
(r)
k,s
)
.
Note that the following relation holds for Eˆ
(r)
k,s:
Eˆ
(L−r)
k+Lr,s
= Eˆ
(r)
k,s. (5)
Next, we introduce the following lemma [11] that relates
the dial and actual measurements. See Appendix A for
its proof.
Lemma 1 We define two conditional
probabilities Pr [s ∧ (i, j)|r′]dial and
Pr [s ∧ (i, j)|r ∈ {r′, L− r′}]actual. Pr [s ∧ (i, j)|r′]dial
represents the probability that Bob obtains the bit value
s from (ith, jth) (i < j) interfering pulses given that he
performs the dial measurement with the delay r = r′ ∈ R.
Pr [s ∧ (i, j)|r ∈ {r′, L− r′}]actual represents the proba-
bility that Bob obtains s from (ith, jth) interfering pulses
given that he performs the actual measurement with the
delays r = r′ or r = L− r′ chosen uniformly at random.
Then, for an arbitrary fixed r′ ∈ R and for any input
state ρˆ,
Pr [s ∧ (i, j)|r′]dial = 2Pr [s ∧ (i, j)|r ∈ {r′, L− r′}]actual
(6)
holds.
Lemma 1 means that, the dial measurement with the de-
lay r′ after performing a half transmittance filter has the
same probability distribution of s and (i, j) as the one
of the actual measurement when Bob switches delays r′
and L−r′ uniformly at random (see FIG. 2(b)). In other
words, Eve cannot distinguish which of the measurement
was actually employed from the classical information an-
nounced by Bob. Thanks to Eq. (6), we are allowed to
5use the dial measurement for proving the security of the
actual protocol. We call the protocol where Bob per-
forms the dial measurement instead of the actual one the
alternative protocol. The alternative protocol runs the
same as the actual protocol except for steps (A2) and
(A3), which are replaced with the following steps (A2’)
and (A3’), respectively.
(A2’) Bob receives the incoming L pulses and splits them
into two L-pulse blocks by using the 50 : 50 BS. He
selects a delay r uniformly at random from the set
R ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , L−1}. After that, Bob performs the
dial measurement. Let us call the event detected if
he detects exactly one photon in the pair of inter-
fering pulses (kth, (k +L r)
th) (1 ≤ k ≤ L), and
detects the vacuum in all the other pairs of inter-
fering pulses. If the event is not detected, Alice and
Bob skip steps (A3’) and (A4).
(A3’) Bob takes note of the detected bit value and an-
nounces the pair of numbers (i, j) = (min{k, k +L
r},max{k, k +L r}) over an authenticated public
channel.
B. Virtual protocol
In this subsection, we introduce the entanglement dis-
tillation protocol to prove the security of the alternative
protocol. Our analysis is based on the Shor-Preskill’s se-
curity proof [20], where we follow similar arguments of
the security proof of the original DPS protocol [9]. To
show Alice and Bob virtually extract a maximally en-
tangled state, we need to introduce ancilla systems on
Alice’s side and decompose Bob’s measurement, which
we explain below.
First, we explain Alice’s sending state in the virtual
protocol. Suppose Alice has a quantum register of L-
qubit system and let HA =
⊗L
k=1HA,k be the Hilbert
space of these systems. Then, Alice’s state preparation
is equivalent to the preparation of the following state over
the quantum register system and L pulses as
|Φδ〉 := 2−L/2
∑
~s
L⊗
k=1
(
Hˆ |sk〉A,k
)
|(−1)skeiδα〉k , (7)
where Hˆ ≡ 1√
2
∑
s,s′=0,1(−1)ss
′ |s〉〈s′| denotes the
Hadamard operator. Note that δ ∈ [0, 2pi) is chosen uni-
formly at random for each preparation of the state |Φδ〉.
As shown in step (A4), the information that Alice needs
to obtain is si ⊕ sj . To obtain this information, she ap-
plies the following quantum circuit (see FIG. 3) to the
qubits i and j upon receiving from Bob, and measures
the qubit Aq in the computational basis {|0〉Aq , |1〉Aq}.
The set of measurement operators that Alice performs
can be represented by
Mˆ
(i,j)
1 =Hˆ |0〉Aq (A,i 〈0|A,j 〈1|) + Hˆ |1〉Aq (A,i 〈1|A,j 〈0|) ,
Mˆ
(i,j)
2 =
1√
2
|0〉Aq (A,i 〈0|A,j 〈0|+ A,i 〈1|A,j 〈1|) ,
Mˆ
(i,j)
3 =
1√
2
|1〉Aq (A,i 〈0|A,j 〈0| − A,i 〈1|A,j 〈1|) . (8)
Note that Alice’s state preparation of |Φδ〉 with a
random and uniform δ followed by the measurement
{M (i,j)m }m=1,2,3 is equivalent to the step (A1). Moreover,
in the virtual protocol, instead of |Φδ〉, Alice prepares the
following state for simplicity of analysis.
|Φ〉 := 2−L/2
∑
~s
∞∑
ν=0
|ν〉C pˆiν
L⊗
k=1
(
Hˆ |sk〉A,k
)
|(−1)skα〉k .
(9)
Here, C is the system that stores the number of photons
contained in the L pulses whose Hilbert space is spanned
by an orthogonal basis {|ν〉C}∞ν=0. Also, pˆiν is the pro-
jection onto the subspace that the total photon number
in the L pulses is ν. From Eve’s perspective, accessible
quantum information of Eqs. (7) and (9) are the same
since the following equation holds.
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dδ|Φδ〉〈Φδ| = TrC|Φ〉〈Φ|. (10)
Next, we explain Bob’s measurement procedure in the
virtual protocol. In principle, he is able to determine
whether the event is detected or not before he determines
the pair of interfering pulses and the bit value by perform-
ing the quantum nondemolition (QND) measurement of
the total photon number in the incoming L pulses. The
event is called detected if and only if the measurement
outcome of the QND measurement is exactly one pho-
ton in the block of L pulses. In the detected events, the
dial measurement is decomposed into two measurements,
namely, the POVM in Eq. (3) is decomposed into
Eˆ
(r)
k,s = Fˆ
(r)†
k Pˆ (|s〉Bq)Fˆ (r)k . (11)
Here, the set of measurement operators Fˆ
(r)
k : HB → HBq
represents a filtering operation that gives the outcome k
and leaves a qubit system HBq, which is defined by
Fˆ
(r)
k :=

1√
2
Hˆ |1〉Bq B 〈k|+
1√
2
Hˆ |0〉Bq B 〈k + r|
if 1 ≤ k ≤ L− r,
1√
2
Hˆ |1〉Bq B 〈k + r − L|+
1√
2
Hˆ |0〉Bq B 〈k|
if L− r + 1 ≤ k ≤ L.
(12)
By using Alice’s quantum circuit represented by FIG. 3
and Bob’s filtering operation described by {Fˆ (r)k }k, we
introduce the following entanglement distillation protocol
(EDP).
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FIG. 3. The quantum circuit representing Alice’s procedure
in the virtual protocol. The inputs are the ith and jth qubits,
where the pair of integers (i, j) (i < j) is announced by
Bob. She applies a C-NOT gate (defined on the Z basis
{|0〉A , |1〉A}) to these qubits, and the jth qubit is subjected
to a Hadamard gate (denoted by H) while the ith qubit is
measured on Z-basis (denoted by MZ). If the outcome of the
Z measurement is 0, she applies a phase flip gate to the jth
qubit with probability 1/2 ,which is denoted by I/Z. Other-
wise, she applies the identity operation to the jth qubit. After
that, we name the quantum system of the jth qubit Aq.
(V1) Alice prepares |Φ〉 and sends a block of L pulses to
Bob through a quantum channel.
(V2) Bob receives the incoming L pulses and performs
the QND measurement of the total photon number
in the L pulses. Let us call the event detected if he
detects exactly one photon in the block of L pulses.
If the event is not detected, Alice and Bob skip steps
(V3) and (V4) below.
(V3) Bob chooses r uniformly at random from the set
R = ⋃tm=1{m,L −m}, and performs the filtering
operation {Fˆ (r)k }. He obtains the pair of pulses
(k, k +L r) where exactly one photon is contained,
and obtains the output qubit Bq. He sends the pair
of integers (i, j) := (min{k, k+Lr},max{k, k+Lr})
to Alice over an authenticated public channel.
(V4) Alice applies the quantum circuit in FIG. 3 on her
ith and jth qubits, and outputs the qubit Aq. Also,
she measures system C and learns the total photon
number ν in the block of L pulses.
(V5) Alice and Bob repeat steps (V1) through (V4) for
N times. Let NQ be the number of the detected
events. At this point, Alice and Bob share NQ
pairs of qubits.
(V6) Alice and Bob randomly select a small portion ξ
of the NQ detected events, measure the qubits in
the computational basis {|0〉 , |1〉}, and compare the
bit values over the public channel. This gives the
estimate of the bit error rate e(b) and hence of the
number e(b)NQ(1−ξ) of bit errors in the remaining
portion.
(V7) Alice and Bob discuss over the public channel to
perform entanglement distillation on the remain-
ing pairs of qubits. Finally, they measure all the
remaining pairs of qubits on the computational ba-
sis to obtain a final key of length GN(1− ξ).
In this protocol, the key generation rate per sending
pulse is written as [21]
G = [Q(1− h(e(b)))− h(ph)]/L, (13)
where h(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x), and h(ph) ex-
presses the number of privacy amplification. The explicit
formula of h(ph) is described by
h(ph) =
∞∑
ν=0
Q(ν)h(e(ph,ν)), (14)
where Q(ν) denotes the function of detected events when
Alice emits ν photons satisfying
∑∞
ν=0Q
(ν) = Q, and
e(ph,ν) denotes the phase error rate when Alice emits ν
photons. Note that the equivalence between steps (A7)
and (V7) is guaranteed by the discussion in [20]. Since
the phase error rate e(ph,ν) cannot be obtained directly
in the actual protocol, we need to estimate e(ph,ν) with
some statistics such as the disturbance information dur-
ing Alice and Bob’s quantum communication.
C. POVM elements for the bit and phase errors
In this subsection, we construct POVMs for the bit
and phase errors to estimate the upper bound on the
phase error rate. To derive the relation between the bit
and the phase error rates, we consider a measurement on
Alice and Bob’s quantum registers A and B just after the
event is detected at step (V2), and regard an outcome
as the occurrence of a bit error or a phase error. In
this subsection, we explain only the definition and the
resulting forms of POVMs for the bit and phase errors.
The detailed derivations are referred to Appendix B.
The POVM element corresponding to the bit error in
the pair of pulses (i, j) for i < j is defined as
eˆ
(b)
i,j :=
∑
si,sj∈{0,1}
Pˆ
(
Hˆ |si〉A,i
)
Pˆ
(
Hˆ |sj〉A,j
)
⊗ 1|R|
∑
r∈R
[
Eˆ
(r)
i,si⊕sj⊕1δj,i+r + Eˆ
(r)
j,si⊕sj⊕1δi,j+r−L
]
=
2
|R|
∑
si,sj∈{0,1}
Pˆ
(
Hˆ |si〉A,i
)
Pˆ
(
Hˆ |sj〉A,j
)
⊗ Eˆ(j−i)i,si⊕sj⊕1.
(15)
Here, |R| denotes the cardinality of the set R, and we use
Eq. (5) in the last equality. Note that we omit identity
operators on the subsystems. Next, the POVM element
7for a phase error is defined by the instances where Alice
and Bob measure their qubits with the Hadamard basis
{Hˆ |0〉 , Hˆ |1〉} and their outcomes disagree. The POVM
element corresponding to the occurrence of the phase er-
ror in the pair of pulses (i, j) for i < j is given by
eˆ
(ph)
i,j :=
1∑
s=0
3∑
k=1
Mˆ
(i,j)†
k Pˆ
(
Hˆ |s〉Aq
)
Mˆ
(i,j)
k
⊗ 1|R|
∑
r∈R
[
Fˆ
(r)†
i Pˆ
(
Hˆ |s¯〉B
)
Fˆ
(r)
i δj,i+r
+Fˆ
(r)†
j Pˆ
(
Hˆ |s¯〉B
)
Fˆ
(r)
j δi,j+r−L
]
=
1
|R|
[
Pˆ
(
|0〉A,i |1〉A,j
)
⊗ Pˆ (|i〉B)
+Pˆ
(
|1〉A,i |0〉A,j
)
⊗ Pˆ (|j〉B)
]
+
1
2|R|
1∑
t=0
Pˆ
(
|t〉A,i |t〉A,j
)
⊗
[
Pˆ (|i〉B) + Pˆ (|j〉B)
]
,
(16)
where s¯ = s⊕ 1. For simplicity of analysis, we introduce
a unitary operator Uˆ acting on HA ⊗HB defined by
Uˆ
L⊗
k′=1
(
Hˆ |sk′〉A,k′
)
|k〉B = (−1)sk
L⊗
k′=1
(
Hˆ |sk′〉A,k′
)
|k〉B .
(17)
By using Uˆ and Eq. (15), it is straightforward to show
that
Uˆ eˆ
(b)
i,j Uˆ
† =
2
|R| 1ˆA ⊗ Eˆ
(j−i)
i,1 = 1ˆA ⊗
1
2|R| Pˆ (|i〉B − |j〉B) .
(18)
Since Uˆ also satisfies
Uˆ Pˆ (|s〉A,k)Pˆ (|k′〉B)Uˆ† = Pˆ (|s⊕ δk,k′〉A,k)Pˆ (|k′〉B),
(19)
we have
Uˆ eˆ
(ph)
i,j Uˆ
† =
1
2|R|
[
Pˆ (|1〉A,i) + Pˆ (|1〉A,j)
]
⊗
[
Pˆ (|i〉B) + Pˆ (|j〉B)
]
. (20)
For the state ρˆ of a detected event, the probability of
having a bit error in the extracted qubit pair Aq and Bq
is expressed by Tr
(
ρˆeˆ(b)
)
, while a phase error is given by
Tr
(
ρˆeˆ(ph)
)
, where eˆ(b) and eˆ(ph) are respectively given by
eˆ(b) =
∑
(i,j):j−i∈R
eˆ
(b)
i,j , eˆ
(ph) =
∑
(i,j):j−i∈R
eˆ
(ph)
i,j . (21)
By applying Uˆ to eˆ(b) in Eq. (21) and using Eq. (18), we
have
Uˆ eˆ(b)Uˆ† = 1ˆA ⊗ Πˆ(b), (22)
where the matrix elements of Πˆ(b) are
B 〈m| Πˆ(b) |n〉B =

1
2 if m = n,
− 12|R| if |m− n| ∈ R ∧ |m− n| 6= L2 ,
− 1|R| if |m− n| ∈ R ∧ |m− n| = L2 ,
0 otherwise.
(23)
By applying Uˆ to eˆ(ph), using Eq. (20) and Pˆ
(
|k〉A,m
)
=∑
~a Pˆ (|~a〉A) δam,k with ~a = a1a2 . . . aL and |~a〉A =
|a1〉A,1 |a2〉A,2 . . . |aL〉A,L, Uˆ eˆ(ph)Uˆ† results in the follow-
ing form.
Uˆ eˆ(ph)Uˆ†
=
∑
~a
Pˆ (|~a〉A)
⊗
L∑
m=1
Pˆ (|m〉B)
1
2
δam,1 +
1
2|R|
∑
n:|m−n|∈R
δan,1

=:
∑
~a
Pˆ (|~a〉A)⊗ Πˆ(ph)~a . (24)
D. Relations between the bit and the phase error
rates
In this subsection, we derive the upper bound on h(ph)
in Eq. (13) by using the bit error rate. For this, we
first derive the range where Alice’s sending state can be
contained. In the virtual protocol, if the initial state
|Φ〉 satisfies 〈Φ| |~a〉A |ν〉C = 0 for a state |~a〉A |ν〉C, the
density operator ρˆ of Aq and Bq originating from |Φ〉 also
satisfies ρˆ |~a〉A |ν〉C = 0. Moreover, we have the following
relations between ~a and ν such that 〈Φ| |~a〉A |ν〉C = 0 is
satisfied [9],
A 〈~a|C 〈ν| |Φ〉 = 0 if |~a| > ν, (25)
A 〈~a|C 〈ν| |Φ〉 = 0 if (−1)|~a| 6= (−1)ν , (26)
where |~a| denotes the number of 1’s in the bit string ~a.
By using Eqs. (25) and (26), ρˆ after Alice obtains ν by
measuring the system C is contained in the range of a
projection operator Pˆ (ν), which is defined by
Pˆ (ν) :=
∑
~a:|~a|=ν,ν−2,ν−4,...
L∑
i=1
Pˆ (|~a〉A ⊗ |i〉B) . (27)
Next, to derive the relation between the bit and phase
error rates, we consider the quantity Ω(ν)(λ) defined as
the largest eigenvalue of the operator
Pˆ (ν)
(
eˆ(ph) − λeˆ(b)
)
Pˆ (ν) (28)
in the range of Pˆ (ν) with λ ≥ 0. By using Ω(ν)(λ), the
phase error rate e(ph,ν) when Alice emits ν photons is
8bounded by the bit error rate e(b,ν) when Alice emits ν
photons as [9]
e(ph,ν) ≤ λe(b,ν) + Ω(ν)(λ). (29)
Since Eq. (29) for various λ ≥ 0 determines a convex
achievable region of (e(b,ν), e(ph,ν)) and h(x) is monoton-
ically increasing, we obtain the convex achievable region
of (e(b,ν), h(e(ph,ν))) specified by
h(e(ph,ν)) ≤ γe(b,ν) + Ω(ν)h (γ) (30)
for various γ ≥ 0. Here, Ω(ν)h (γ) is the quantity depend-
ing on γ and Ω(ν)(λ).
In order to derive an upper bound on the leaked infor-
mation h(ph) in Eq. (14), we consider the optimization
of Q(ν) such that Eve’s information is maximal. Since
NQ(ν) is the number of qubits extracted in the step (V5)
from the detected events when Alice emits ν photons,
Q(ν) needs to satisfy the following physical requirement
regarding the number of total events when Alice emits ν
photons
NQ(ν) ≤ Npν , (31)
where pν denotes the Poisson distribution with mean
Lα2,
pν := e
−Lα2 (Lα
2)ν
ν!
. (32)
Let q(ν) be a fraction of detected events when Alice emits
ν photons among all the detection,
q(ν) =
Q(ν)
Q
=
Q(ν)∑∞
ν=0Q
(ν)
. (33)
Here, q(ν) is chosen by Eve under the constraint of
Eq. (31). As long as Ω(0)(λ) ≤ Ω(1)(λ) ≤ Ω(2)(λ) ≤ . . .
holds for all λ ≥ 0, Eve can maximize the amount of
leaked information by using the events with a larger value
of ν. Therefore, the optimal strategy for Eve is the fol-
lowing choice:
q(ν) =

Q−1pν if ν ≥ ν0 + 1
1−Q−1(1−∑ν0ν′=0 pν′) if ν = ν0
0 if ν ≤ ν0 − 1,
(34)
where ν0 is the integer satisfying
1−
ν0∑
ν′=0
pν′ < Q ≤ 1−
ν0−1∑
ν′=0
pν′ . (35)
By using {q(ν)}ν and Eq. (30), the upper bound on h(ph)
in Eq. (14) is written as
h(ph) =
∞∑
ν=0
q(ν)h(e(ph,ν))
≤min
γ≥0
{
γe(b) +
∞∑
ν=0
q(ν)Ω
(ν)
h (γ)
}
, (36)
where e(b) =
∑
ν q
(ν)e(b,ν) is the bit error rate in the
actual protocol. The task left to obtain the upper bound
on h(ph) is to evaluate the quantities Ω(ν)(λ) for ν ∈
[0,∞). In our analysis, we consider the upper bounds on
Ω(ν)(λ) for ν = 1, 2, and for ν ≥ 3 we make a pessimistic
assumption that all the information is leaked to Eve, that
is, Ω(ν)(λ) ≡ 1. With this consideration, Eq. (36) is
upper bounded by
h(ph) ≤ min
γ≥0
{
γe(b) +
2∑
ν=0
q(ν)Ω
(ν)
h (γ) + q
(ν≥3)
}
(37)
with q(ν≥3) :=
∑∞
ν=3 q
(ν).
E. Evaluation of Ω(ν)(λ)
To evaluate Ω(ν)(λ), we apply the unitary operation Uˆ
in Eq. (17) to Eq. (28), and we obtain [9]
Uˆ Pˆ (ν)Uˆ†
(
Uˆ eˆ(ph)Uˆ† − λUˆ eˆ(b)Uˆ†
)
Uˆ Pˆ (ν)Uˆ†
=
∑
~a:|~a|=ν−1,ν−3,...
Pˆ (|~a〉A)⊗ (Πˆ(ph)~a − λΠˆ(b))
+
∑
~a:|~a|=ν+1
Pˆ (|~a〉A)⊗ Pˆ~a(Πˆ(ph)~a − λΠˆ(b))Pˆ~a. (38)
Here, we use the following equation
Uˆ Pˆ (ν)Uˆ† =
∑
~a:|~a|=ν−1,ν−3,...
Pˆ (|~a〉A)⊗ 1ˆB
+
∑
~a:|~a|=ν+1
Pˆ (|~a〉A)⊗ Pˆ~a, (39)
where
Pˆ~a :=
L∑
i=1
δai,1Pˆ (|i〉B) . (40)
Since Πˆ
(ph)
~a ≥ Πˆ(ph)~a′ for (~a,~a′) such that ai ≥ a′i for all i,
we can neglect the operators with ~a satisfying |~a| ≤ ν−3.
Therefore, we have only to consider Ω
(ν)
− (λ) defined as the
largest eigenvalue of the operators
{Πˆ(ph)~a − λΠˆ(b) | |~a| = ν − 1}, (41)
and Ω
(ν)
+ (λ) defined as the largest eigenvalue of the op-
erators
{Pˆ~a(Πˆ(ph)~a − λΠˆ(b))Pˆ~a | |~a| = ν + 1}. (42)
Let e
(ph,ν)
± be the upper bound on the phase error rate
when we employ Ω
(ν)
± (λ), respectively. e
(ph,ν)
± is given by
e
(ph,ν)
± = min
λ≥0
{λe(b,ν) + Ω(ν)± (λ)}. (43)
Regarding Ω
(ν)
+ (λ), we have an analytical formula that
is given in the following lemma (see Appendix C for its
proof).
9Lemma 2 If ν ≤ |R|/2,
Ω
(ν)
+ (λ) =
1− λ
2
+ ν
1 + λ
2|R| (44)
holds for arbitrary λ ≥ 0.
By applying this lemma to Eq. (43), we obtain the ana-
lytical solution for the upper bound on e
(ph,ν)
+ .
e
(ph,ν)
+ ≤ min
λ≥0
{
λe(b,ν) +
1− λ
2
+ ν
1 + λ
2|R|
}
=
|R|+ ν
2|R| + minλ≥0
{
λ
(
e(b,ν) − |R| − ν
2|R|
)}

≤ 0 if e(b,ν) < |R| − ν
2|R| =
1
2
− ν
2|R| ,
=
|R|+ ν
2|R| =
1
2
+
ν
2|R|
if e(b,ν) ≥ |R| − ν
2|R| =
1
2
− ν
2|R| ,
(45)
where Eq. (45) is independent of the length L of one
block. Note that if ν > |R|/2, Lemma 2 cannot be ap-
plied, however, Ω
(ν)
+ (λ) for this case is also easily de-
rived by following the same discussion of the derivation
of Eq. (44) (the discussion in Appendix C covers this sit-
uation, for example |R| = ν = 2). On the other hand,
to derive the upper bound Ω
(ν)
− (λ) in Eq. (41), we need
to solve the largest eigenvalue of Πˆ
(ph)
~a − λΠˆ(b), which is
written as
Πˆ
(ph)
~a − λΠˆ(b)
=
L∑
m=1
Pˆ (|m〉B)
1
2
δam,1 +
1
2|R|
∑
n:|m−n|∈R
δan,1

− λ
1
2
1ˆB − 1
2|R|
∑
(m,n):|m−n|∈R
|m〉B B 〈n|

=
L∑
m=1
Pˆ (|m〉B)
δam,1 − λ
2
+
1
2|R|
∑
n:|m−n|∈R
δan,1

+
λ
2|R|
∑
(m,n):|m−n|∈R
|m〉B B 〈n| . (46)
To discuss the eigenvalues of Eq. (46), we recall the fact
that the translation operation Vˆ~a,~a′ defined for (~a,~a
′)
such that ak = a
′
k+Lκ
is satisfied for any k ∈ {1, . . . , L}
with specific κ ∈ {1, . . . , L},
Vˆ~a,~a′ :=
L∑
m=1
|m+L κ〉B B 〈m| (47)
does not change the eigenvalues. Hence, the eigenvalues
of Eq. (46) with ~a and ~a′ are the same if there exists κ
(1 ≤ κ ≤ L) such that ak = a′k+Lκ is satisfied for any
k ∈ {1, . . . , L}. By using this, for ν = 2, it is enough to
consider the case ~a = (
|R|/2︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 . . . 0 10 . . . 0), where the matrix
representation of Eq. (46) is written as
1
2|R|diag{
|R|/2︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1, |R|,
|R|/2︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1, 0 . . . 0}L
−λ
2
IL +
λ
2|R|A
(|R|/2)
L . (48)
Here, A
(k)
n is an n× n matrix satisfying
(A(k)n )l,m =

1 if 1 ≤ |l −m| ≤ k,
1 if n− k ≤ |l −m| ≤ n− 1,
0 otherwise.
(49)
In order to obtain the largest eigenvalue of Eq. (48) for
large L, we take a numerical approach. For ν = 1, how-
ever, the upper bound on Ω
(ν)
− (λ) can be easily derived,
and we obtain the following theorem for the upper bound
on e(ph,1) (see Appendix D for its proof).
Theorem 1 For 0 ≤ e(b,1) ≤ |R|−12|R| ,
e(ph,1) ≤ |R|+ 1|R| − 1e
(b,1) (50)
holds. Also, for e(b,1) ≥ |R|−12|R| , we have
e(ph,1) ≤ 1
2
+
1
2|R| . (51)
For ν > 1, the upper bound on e(ph,ν) is derived as the
maximum value of the convex combination of the one on
e
(ph,ν)
+ and e
(ph,ν)
− as
e(ph,ν) ≤ max
p:0≤p≤1
px++(1−p)x−=e(b,ν)
{
pf
(ν)
+ (x+) + (1− p)f (ν)− (x−)
}
,
(52)
where f
(ν)
± (x) is defined by
f
(ν)
± (x) = min
λ±≥0
{
λ±x+ Ω
(ν)
± (λ±)
}
. (53)
In FIG. 4 (a) and (b), we plot the estimated upper
bound on the phase error rate e(ph,ν) as a function of
e(b,ν) with the number of delays |R| ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10} for
ν ∈ {1, 2}. From these figures, even if the number of
the random delays is small (say |R| = 2), we can observe
a significant improvement over the original DPS proto-
col. Moreover, when we compare the resulting phase er-
ror rate of the SNRDPS protocol (solid lines) with the
one of the RRDPS protocol (dashed lines) with the small
random delays, the phase error rate of the SNRDPS pro-
tocol is smaller if the bit error rate is small. Here, we
assume the phase error rate of the RRDPS protocol as
e(ph) = ν/|R| [11].
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FIG. 4. (Color online) The upper bound on the phase error
rate e(ph,ν) as a function of the bit error rate e(b,ν) in the case
of (a) ν = 1 and (b) ν = 2, respectively. From bottom to top,
the solid lines correspond to the case of the SNRDPS proto-
col with (L, |R|) = (32, 10), (32, 8), (32, 6), (32, 4) and (32, 2),
respectively. The black solid line on the topmost of both
figures corresponds to the case for the original DPS proto-
col [9] with L = 32. Also, from bottom to top, the dashed
lines correspond to the case of the RRDPS protocol [11] with
(L, |R|) = (11, 10), (9, 8), (7, 6) and (5, 4), respectively.
IV. KEY GENERATION RATES
In this section, we present our main results, namely,
the key generation rate of the SNRDPS protocol is sig-
nificantly enhanced over the one of the original DPS pro-
tocol only by employing a few additional delays such as
|R| = 2. In FIG. 5, we compare the key generation rate G
per pulse in Eq. (13) for three protocols: (i) the original
DPS protocol [9], (ii) the RRDPS protocol [11] without
monitoring the disturbance when Bob employs the num-
ber of random delays |R|, and (iii) the SNRDPS proto-
col when Bob employs the number of random delays |R|.
From FIG. 5 (a), we can see that the key generation rate
of the SNRDPS protocol with |R| = 2 outperforms the
original DPS protocol when the fiber length is more than
about 40km and the bit error rate e(b) is 2%. Also, the
SNRDPS protocol always outperforms the original DPS
protocol when |R| ≥ 4 and e(b) = 2%. Moreover, from
FIG. 5 (b), the SNRDPS protocol provides a positive
key generation rate even though the original DPS proto-
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FIG. 5. (Color online) The key generation rate G in log-
arithmic scale vs fiber length. We assume Bob’s detection
efficiency of 10%, the channel transmittance of 0.2dB/km,
and the bit error rate e(b) = 2% in (a) and e(b) = 5%
in (b), respectively. In this simulation, we have optimized
the mean photon number µ = |α|2. From top to bot-
tom, the solid lines are for the SNRDPS protocols with
(L, |R|) = (32, 10), (32, 8), (32, 6), (32, 4) and (32, 2), respec-
tively. The key generation rate of the original DPS proto-
col [9] with L = 32 is plotted in the bottommost solid line
in (a). In the original DPS protocol, the secret key cannot
be extracted when e(b) = 5%. Also, from top to bottom,
the dashed lines express the resulting key generation rates for
the RRDPS protocol with (L, |R|) = (11, 10), (9, 8), (7, 6) and
(5, 4), respectively. Note that the dashed lines corresponding
(L, |R|) = (5, 4) disappeared from (b) since the rate is zero.
col cannot generate the secret key. Also, in both figures,
by comparing two lines with the same colors, we confirm
that the SNRDPS protocol outperforms the RRDPS pro-
tocol with the same |R| up to |R| = 10. This means that,
if the amount of randomness is small as 2 ≤ |R| ≤ 10 and
e(b) ≤ 5%, the key generation rate of the SNRDPS pro-
tocol outperforms the one of the RRDPS protocol when
both protocols employ the same number of random de-
lays |R| and Alice and Bob do not monitor the bit error
rate in the RRDPS protocol.
Next, we discuss the transmittance dependency of the
key generation rates for the SNRDPS protocol. For this,
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FIG. 6. (Color online) The optimal light intensity Lµ to
achieve the key generation rate in FIG. 5 in logarithmic
scale vs fibre length when the bit error rate e(b) = 2%
in (a) and e(b) = 5% in (b). From top to bottom, the
solid lines are for the cases of the SNRDPS protocol with
(L, |R|) = (32, 10), (32, 8), (32, 6), (32, 4), and (32, 2), respec-
tively. The light intensity of the original DPS protocol [9]
with L = 32 is plotted in the bottom solid line in (a). In
the original DPS protocol, the optimal light intensity cannot
be found when e(b) = 5%. Also, from top to bottom, the
dashed lines express the cases for the RRDPS protocol with
(L, |R|) = (11, 10), (9, 8), (7, 6), and (5, 4), respectively. Note
that the dashed lines corresponding (L, |R|) = (5, 4) is dis-
appeared in (b) since the optimal light intensity cannot be
found.
we assume a fibre-based QKD system, and the detec-
tion efficiency Q is assumed to be Q = Lµη2 e
−Lµη. Here,
µ := |α|2 denotes the mean photon number of per send-
ing pulse, and η = η(l) denotes channel transmittance
with the fibre length l as η(l) := η0× 10− 0.2l10 with η0 de-
noting Bob’s detection efficiency. If µ is small (µ < 1), Q
and pν are approximated to Q ∼ O(µη) and pν ∼ O(µν),
respectively. Suppose that Alice and Bob generate the
secret key from the ν-photon emissions. In this case, by
considering Eve’s attack, the total detection efficiency
Q ∼ O(µη) minus the probability of emitting more than
ν+1 photons (approximated to µν+1) has to be positive,
resulting in O(µν+1) ≤ O(µη). From this, we obtain the
dependency of µ over the transmittance as
µ ∼ O(η1/ν), (54)
and hence the key generation rate G behaves as
G ∼ Q ∼ O(η(ν+1)/ν). (55)
In FIG. 5 (a), all the lines of the SNRDPS proto-
col except for the one with (L, |R|) = (32, 2) and the
one of the RRDPS protocol with |R| = 10 result in
the transmittance dependency as G ∼ O(η3/2), which
means that the secret key is extracted from the two-
photon emission events in addition to the single-photon
emission events. On the other hand, the line of the orig-
inal DPS protocol and the ones of the RRDPS protocol
with |R| = 4, 6 result in the transmittance dependency as
G ∼ O(η2) since the upper bound on the phase error rate
of the two-photon emission events is too high to extract
the secret key. Moreover, the SNRDPS protocol with
(L, |R|) = (32, 2) and the RRDPS protocol with |R| = 8
provide the key generation rate of the form G ∼ O(η2)
for shorter distance and G ∼ O(η3/2) for longer distance.
The implication of this is that when the loss increases,
the two-photon contribution becomes larger, and more-
over the bit error rate of 2% is still small enough to gen-
erate the key from the two-photon emission event. Also,
in FIG. 5 (b), all the lines of the SNRDPS protocol ex-
cept the one with (L, |R|) = (32, 4) and (32, 2) result in
the transmittance dependency as G ∼ O(η2) for shorter
distance and G ∼ O(η3/2) for longer distance, while all
the remaining lines result in the transmittance depen-
dency as G ∼ O(η2). Even when the bit error rate is 5%,
the properties of transmittance dependency of the key
generation rates including the change of the scaling from
the short and the long distance regimes can be explained
with the same reason as the ones in Fig 5 (a).
Finally, FIG. 6 (a) and (b) show the optimal mean
photon number Lµ to realize the key generation rates in
FIG. 5 (a) and (b), respectively. For all the protocols,
it can be found that the optimal mean photon number
scales as O(η1/ν) for ν-photon emission event, which is
the same scaling as Eq. (54). Also, the discontinuous
point of the lines in FIG. 6 (a) and (b), which repre-
sents the boundary of the presence or absence of the two-
photon contribution, corresponds to the changing point
of the scaling of the key generation rates in FIG. 5 (a)
and (b), respectively.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, in this paper, we have proposed a new
DPS-type QKD protocol with a small random delays
at Bob’s measurement and analyzed its information-
theoretical security. For this protocol, we have estimated
an upper bound on the phase error rate for Alice’s sin-
gle and two-photon emission events by using the bit er-
ror rate information. Besides, we have simulated and
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compared the key generation rates for the SNRDPS pro-
tocol with |R| ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}, the one for the original
DPS protocol, and the ones for the RRDPS protocol with
|R| ∈ {4, 6, 8, 10}. As a result, we found that the perfor-
mance of the SNRDPS protocol is significantly enhanced
from the original DPS protocol even when Bob employs
only a few number of delays such as |R| = 2. Moreover,
we found that if |R| ≤ 10, the key generation rate of the
SNRDPS protocol based on our analysis outperforms the
RRDPS protocol without monitoring the disturbance [11]
when the same number of random delays is employed.
The SNRDPS protocol is an intermediate protocol be-
tween the original DPS and the RRDPS protocols in
terms of the practicality and bit error tolerance, and this
protocol increases the variety of future implementation
for the DPS-type QKD protocol.
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
Here, we prove Lemma 1 in the main text. First, we
have that Eˆ
(r)
k,s satisfies the following relation
Eˆ
(r)
k,s =
{
Bˆ
(r)
k,s if 1 ≤ k ≤ L− r,
Bˆ
(L−r)
k−L+r,s if L− r + 1 ≤ k ≤ L.
(A1)
This is so because Eˆ
(r)
k,s is written as
Eˆ
(r)
k,s =
1
2
Pˆ
( |k〉B + (−1)s |k + r〉B√
2
)
= Bˆ
(r)
k,s (A2)
for 1 ≤ k ≤ L− r and
Eˆ
(r)
k,s =
1
2
Pˆ
( |k〉B + (−1)s |k − L+ r〉B√
2
)
=
1
2
Pˆ
(
(−1)s |k − L+ r + (L− r)〉B + |k − L+ r〉B√
2
)
=Bˆ
(L−r)
k−L+r,s (A3)
for L− r + 1 ≤ k ≤ L. By using Eq. (A1) and regarding
Bˆ
(r)
k,s = 0 if k ≤ 0 or L− r+ 1 ≤ k, we have the following
equation.
Eˆ
(r)
k,s = Bˆ
(r)
k,s + Bˆ
(L−r)
k−L+r,s. (A4)
If we fix the delay of the dial measurement as r′, the prob-
ability that Bob obtains the bit value s and announces
the pair of integers (i, j) (i < j) is given by
Pr [s ∧ (i, j)|r′]dial =Tr
(
ρˆEˆ
(r′)
i,s
)
δj−i,r′
+ Tr
(
ρˆEˆ
(r′)
j,s
)
δj−i,L−r′ . (A5)
To simulate the dial measurement with the delay r′ by us-
ing Bob’s actual measurement, he randomly switches the
delays of the actual measurement r′ and L−r′. The prob-
ability that Bob obtains the outcome s and announces
(i, j) when he performs the actual measurement is writ-
ten as
Tr
(
ρˆBˆ
(r′)
i,s
)
δj−i,r′ (A6)
if the delay is r′ and
Tr
(
ρˆBˆ
(L−r′)
i,s
)
δj−i,L−r′ (A7)
if the delay is L − r′. Let us define
Pr [s ∧ (i, j)|r ∈ {r′, L− r′}]actual as the probability that
Bob obtains s and announces (i, j) when he performs the
actual measurement with the delay r = r′ or r = L − r′
uniformly at random. Pr [s ∧ (i, j)|r ∈ {r′, L− r′}]actual
is written as
Pr [s ∧ (i, j)|r ∈ {r′, L− r′}]actual
=
1
2
Tr
(
ρˆBˆ
(r′)
i,s
)
δj−i,r′ +
1
2
Tr
(
ρˆBˆ
(L−r′)
i,s
)
δj−i,L−r′
=
1
2
Tr
(
ρˆBˆ
(r′)
i,s
)
δj−i,r′ +
1
2
Tr
(
ρˆBˆ
(L−r′)
j−L+r′,s
)
δj−i,L−r′
=
1
2
Tr
(
ρˆ
[
Eˆ
(r′)
i,s − Bˆ(L−r
′)
i−L+r′,s
])
δj−i,r′
+
1
2
Tr
(
ρˆ
[
Eˆ
(r′)
j,s − Bˆ(r
′)
j,s
])
δj−i,L−r′
=
1
2
[
Tr
(
ρˆEˆ
(r′)
i,s
)
δj−i,r′ + Tr
(
ρˆEˆ
(r′)
j,s
)
δj−i,L−r′
]
− 1
2
Tr
(
ρˆ
[
Bˆ
(L−r′)
i−L+r′,sδj−i,r′ + Bˆ
(r′)
j,s δj−i,L−r′
])
=
1
2
Pr [s ∧ (i, j)|r′]dial , (A8)
where we have used Eqs. (A4) and (A5) in the third and
fifth equalities, respectively. Also, we have used
Bˆ
(L−r′)
i−L+r′,sδj−i,r′ + Bˆ
(r′)
j,s δj−i,L−r′
=Bˆ
(L−r′)
i−L+r′,sδi−L+r′,j−L + Bˆ
(r′)
j,s δj,L−r′+i
=Bˆ
(L−r′)
j−L,s δi−L+r′,j−L + Bˆ
(r′)
L−r′+i,sδj,L−r′+i = 0 (A9)
in the fifth equality, which is satisfied since Bˆ
(r)
k,s = 0 for
k ≤ 0 or L− r+ 1 ≤ k, and (i, j) satisfies 1 ≤ i < j ≤ L.
13
Appendix B: Detail of calculation of bit and phase
error POVMs
Here, we detail the calculation of the equations of bit
and phase error POVMs. First, Eq. (16) is derived as
follows.
eˆ
(ph)
i,j :=
1∑
s=0
3∑
k=1
Mˆ
(i,j)†
k Pˆ
(
Hˆ |s〉Aq
)
Mˆ
(i,j)
k ⊗
1
|R|
∑
r∈R
[
Fˆ
(r)†
i Pˆ
(
Hˆ |s¯〉B
)
Fˆ
(r)
i δj,i+r + Fˆ
(r)†
j Pˆ
(
Hˆ |s¯〉B
)
Fˆ
(r)
j δi,j+r−L
]
=
1
|R|
1∑
s=0
3∑
k=1
Mˆ
(i,j)†
k Pˆ
(
Hˆ |s〉Aq
)
Mˆ
(i,j)
k ⊗
[
Fˆ
(j−i)†
i Pˆ
(
Hˆ |s¯〉B
)
Fˆ
(j−i)
i + Fˆ
(L−(j−i))†
j Pˆ
(
Hˆ |s¯〉B
)
Fˆ
(L−(j−i))
j
]
=
2
|R|
1∑
s=0
3∑
k=1
Mˆ
(i,j)†
k Pˆ
(
Hˆ |s〉Aq
)
Mˆ
(i,j)
k ⊗ Fˆ†i,jPˆ
(
Hˆ |s¯〉B
)
Fˆi,j
=
1
|R|
1∑
s=0
[
Pˆ
(
|s〉A,i |s¯〉A,j
)
+
1
2
1∑
t=0
Pˆ
(
|t〉A,i |t〉A,j
)]
⊗ Pˆ (δs¯,1 |i〉B + δs¯,0 |j〉B)
=
1
|R|
[
Pˆ
(
|0〉A,i |1〉A,j
)
⊗ Pˆ (|i〉B) + Pˆ
(
|1〉A,i |0〉A,j
)
⊗ Pˆ (|j〉B)
]
+
1
2|R|
1∑
t=0
Pˆ
(
|t〉A,i |t〉A,j
)
⊗
[
Pˆ (|i〉B) + Pˆ (|j〉B)
]
.
(B1)
Here, we define s¯ := s ⊕ 1 and Fˆi,j := 1√2Hˆ |1〉Bq B 〈i| +
1√
2
Hˆ |0〉Bq B 〈j|.
Next, we detail the derivation of Eq. (22) as follows.
Πˆ(b) in Eq. (22) is written as
Πˆ(b) :=
1
2|R|
∑
(i,j):j−i∈R
Pˆ (|i〉B − |j〉B)
=
1
2|R|
∑
(i,j):j−i∈R
[
Pˆ (|i〉B) + Pˆ (|j〉B)
−
(
|i〉B B 〈j|+ |j〉B B 〈i|
)]
=
1
2|R|
∑
(m,n):|m−n|∈R
[
Pˆ (|m〉B)− |m〉B B 〈n|
]
=
1
2
1ˆB − 1
2|R|
∑
(m,n):|m−n|∈R
|m〉B B 〈n| , (B2)
which concludes Eq. (23).
Finally, we detail transformation in Eq. (24) as follows.
Uˆ eˆ(ph)Uˆ†
=
1
2|R|
∑
(i,j):j−i∈R
[
Pˆ (|1〉A,i) + Pˆ (|1〉A,j)
]
⊗
[
Pˆ (|i〉B) + Pˆ (|j〉B)
]
=
1
2|R|
∑
(m,n):|m−n|∈R
[
Pˆ (|1〉A,m) + Pˆ (|1〉A,n)
]
⊗ Pˆ (|m〉B)
=
1
2|R|
∑
(m,n):|m−n|∈R
∑
~a
Pˆ (|~a〉A) (δam,1 + δan,1)⊗ Pˆ (|m〉B)
=
∑
~a
Pˆ (|~a〉A)
⊗ 1
2|R|
L∑
m=1
∑
n:|m−n|∈R
(δam,1 + δan,1) Pˆ (|m〉B)
=
∑
~a
Pˆ (|~a〉A)
⊗
L∑
m=1
Pˆ (|m〉B)
1
2
δam,1 +
1
2|R|
∑
n:|m−n|∈R
δan,1

=:
∑
~a
Pˆ (|~a〉A)⊗ Πˆ(ph)~a . (B3)
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Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 2
Here, we prove Lemma 2 in the main text. We consider
the maximization of the largest eigenvalue of Pˆ~a(Πˆ
(ph)
~a −
λΠˆ(b))Pˆ~a in Eq. (42) over ~a with |~a| = ν + 1. By using
Eq. (46), Pˆ~a(Πˆ
(ph)
~a − λΠˆ(b))Pˆ~a is written as
Pˆ~a(Πˆ
(ph)
~a − λΠˆ(b))Pˆ~a
=
L∑
m=1
Pˆ (|m〉B) δam,1
δam,1 − λ
2
+
1
2|R|
∑
n:|m−n|∈R
δan,1

+
λ
2|R|
∑
(m,n):|m−n|∈R
|m〉B B 〈n| δam,1δan,1
=
∑
m:am=1
Pˆ (|m〉B)
1− λ
2
+
1
2|R|
∑
m:|m−n|∈R
δan,1

+
λ
2|R|
∑
m:|m−n|∈R
|m〉B B 〈n| δan,1

=
∑
m:am=1
{
1− λ
2
Pˆ (|m〉B)
+
∑
n:|m−n|∈R∧an=1
[
1
2|R| Pˆ (|m〉B) +
λ
2|R| |m〉B B 〈n|
]
=
∑
m:am=1
1− λ
2
Pˆ (|m〉B)
+
∑
(m,n):
|m−n|∈R∧(am,an)=(1,1)
[
1
2|R| Pˆ (|m〉B) +
λ
2|R| |m〉B B 〈n|
]
.
(C1)
Since R = ⋃tm=1{m,L −m}, the coefficient of Pˆ (|m〉B)
for m such that am = 1 in Eq. (C1) is written as
1− λ
2
+
1
2|R|#
{
n
∣∣∣∣ n ∈ {1, . . . , L}∧|m− n| ∈ R ∧ an = 1
}
=
1− λ
2
+
1
2|R|
L∑
n=1
δan,1
t∑
l=1
(δn,m+Ll + δn,m−Ll) . (C2)
Here, #{n | A(n)} denotes the number of n satisfying the
condition A(n), and −L denotes subtraction modulo L,
namely, for integers (p, q) with 1 ≤ p ≤ L and 1 ≤ q ≤ L,
p−L q =
{
p− q if p ≥ q + 1,
p− q + L if p ≤ q. (C3)
Also, the coefficient of |m〉B B 〈n| for m,n such that
(am, an) = (1, 1) in Eq. (C1) is written as{
λ
2|R| if n = m±L l (1 ≤ l ≤ t),
0 otherwise.
(C4)
Next, we classify ~a in terms of the resulting eigenvalues
of Eq. (C1). In so doing, note that the translation oper-
ation (as this is a unitary operator) defined by Eq. (47)
does not change the eigenvalues of Eq. (C1). Hence, the
eigenvalues of Eq. (C1) with ~a and ~a′ are the same if there
exists κ (1 ≤ κ ≤ L) such that ak = a′k+Lκ is satisfied
for any k ∈ {1, . . . , L} and hence it is suffice to consider
~a ∈ [~a] = {~a′ | ∃κ ∈ {1, . . . , L} s.t. a′k+Lκ = ak for ∀k ∈{1, . . . , L}} to derive the eigenvalues of Eq. (C1). In or-
der to characterize ~a, we introduce an |~a|(= ν+1)-length
vector ~p = (p1p2 . . . pν+1) that satisfies
apj = 1 for ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , ν + 1}, (C5)
1 ≤ p1 < p2 < · · · < pν+1 ≤ L. (C6)
By using ~p, we can convert the problem of deriving the
largest eigenvalue of Eq. (C1) to the maximization prob-
lem of the largest eigenvalue of the following matrix.
1− λ
2
Iν+1 +
1
2|R|Bν+1(λ). (C7)
Here, Iν+1 denotes the (ν + 1)× (ν + 1) identity matrix
and Bν+1(λ) denotes the (ν + 1)× (ν + 1) matrix whose
diagonal element (Bν+1(λ))m,m is given by
(Bν+1(λ))m,m =#{k | k ∈ {1, . . . , ν + 1} ∧ |pm − pk| ∈ R}
=
ν+1∑
k=1
t∑
l=1
(δpk,pm+Ll + δpk,pm−Ll)
=
t∑
l=1
ν+1∑
k=1
(δpk,pm+Ll + δpk,pm−Ll)
=
t∑
l=1
ν+1∑
k=1:k 6=m
(δpk,pm+Ll + δpk,pm−Ll) ,
(C8)
and its off-diagonal element (Bν+1(λ))m,n (m 6= n) is
given by
(Bν+1(λ))m,n =
{
λ if pn = pm ±L l (1 ≤ l ≤ t).
0 otherwise.
(C9)
Among [~a], we need to find ~a that achieves the largest
eigenvalue of Eq. (C7). For this, we use the following
fact.
Fact 1 For any real matrix with non-negative off-
diagonal elements, the largest eigenvalue is maximized
when all the matrix elements are maximized.
Proof. We consider two n× n real matrices A = (Ai,j)i,j
and A˜ = (A˜i,j)i,j such that Ai,j ≥ A˜i,j holds for any
i, j ∈ {1, . . . n} and Ai,j , A˜i,j ≥ 0 holds if i 6= j. Suppose
that |ψ〉 = (x1x2 . . . xn)T and |ψ˜〉 = (x˜1x˜2 . . . x˜n)T are
normalized eigenvectors of A and A˜ that give the largest
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eigenvalue of A and A˜, respectively. Since both A and
A˜ are real and all the off-diagonal elements of A and A˜
are non-negative, we can choose |ψ〉 and |ψ˜〉 such that
all the elements of |ψ〉 and |ψ˜〉 are real and non-negative.
By using |ψ〉 and |ψ˜〉, the largest eigenvalue of A and A˜
are respectively given by
〈A〉max := 〈ψ|A |ψ〉 =
∑
i,j
Ai,jxixj , (C10)
〈A˜〉max := 〈ψ˜| A˜ |ψ˜〉 =
∑
i,j
A˜i,j x˜ix˜j . (C11)
Since Ai,j ≥ A˜i,j holds for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . n} and |ψ〉
gives the largest eigenvalue of A, we have
〈A˜〉max =
∑
i,j
A˜i,j x˜ix˜j ≤
∑
i,j
Ai,j x˜ix˜j = 〈ψ˜|A |ψ˜〉
≤ 〈ψ|A |ψ〉 = 〈A〉max , (C12)
which ends the proof.
By using Fact 1, the largest eigenvalue of Eq. (C7)
is obtained when pj + 1 = pj+1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , ν},
namely, ~a = (0 . . . 0
ν+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 . . . 1 0 . . . 0) in Eq. (C1). For ex-
ample, if ν = 2 and |R| = 2, Eq. (C7) with ~a =
(0 . . . 01110 . . . 0) is rewritten as 1−λ2 + 14 λ4 0λ
4
1−λ
2 +
1
2
λ
4
0 λ4
1−λ
2 +
1
4
 , (C13)
and this results in the largest eigenvalue of Eq. (C1),
which corresponds to Ω
(2)
+ (λ) for R = {1, L}. More-
over, if ν ≤ t (= |R|/2), Eq. (C7) with ~a =
(0 . . . 0
ν+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 . . . 1 0 . . . 0) is rewritten as
1− λ
2
Iν+1 +
1
2|R|Bν+1(λ), (C14)
where Bν+1(λ) denotes the (ν+1)×(ν+1) matrix whose
elements are given by
(Bν+1(λ))m,n =
{
ν if m = n,
λ otherwise.
(C15)
Eq. (C14) has only two eigenvalues: (1 − λ)/2 + (ν −
λ)/(2|R|) and (1− λ)/2 + ν(1 + λ)/(2|R|). Since λ ≥ 0,
we have
Ω
(ν)
+ (λ) =
1− λ
2
+ ν
1 + λ
2|R| , (C16)
which concludes Eq. (44).
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 1
Here, we prove Theorem 1 in the main text. In or-
der to maximize e
(ph,1)
− , we derive an upper bound on
Ω
(1)
− (λ). For this, we consider the largest eigenvalue of
Πˆ
(ph)
~a −λΠˆ(b) for |~a| = ν−1 = 0, namely, ~a = (00 . . . 0) =:
~0. Since Πˆ
(ph)
~0
= 0, Ω
(1)
− (λ) is given by the largest eigen-
value of −λΠˆ(b), which is non-positive. Hence, e(ph,1)− is
upper bounded by e
(ph,1)
− = minλ≥0{λe(b,1) + Ω(1)− (λ)} ≤
minλ≥0{λe(b,1)} = 0. For e(b,1)+ , from Eq. (45), we obtain
e
(ph,1)
+ ≤
1
2
+
1
2|R| (D1)
for e(b,1) ≥ |R|−12|R| . Also, for 0 ≤ e(b,1) ≤ |R|−12|R| , e(ph,1) is
upper bounded by
e(ph,1) ≤ 2|R||R| − 1e
(b,1)
(
1
2
+
1
2|R|
)
=
|R|+ 1
|R| − 1e
(b,1)
(D2)
by choosing p in Eq. (52) as p = 2|R||R|−1e
(b,1). Therefore,
by combining Eqs. (D1) and (D2), we conclude Eq. (50).
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